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Abstract—Supply chains lend themselves to blockchain tech-
nology, but certain challenges remain, especially around invoice
financing. For example, the further a supplier is removed from
the final consumer product, the more difficult it is to get their
invoices financed. Moreover, for competitive reasons, retailers
and manufacturers do not want to disclose their supply chains.
However, upstream suppliers need to prove that they are part of a
‘stable’ supply chain to get their invoices financed, which presents
the upstream suppliers with huge, and often unsurmountable,
obstacles to get the necessary finance to fulfil the next order, or
to expand their business. Using a fictitious supply chain use case,
which is based on a real world use case, we demonstrate how
these challenges have the potential to be solved by combining
more advanced and specialised blockchain technologies with
other technologies such as Artificial Intelligence. We describe
how atomic crosschain functionality can be utilised across private
blockchains to retrieve the information required for an invoice
financier to make informed decisions under uncertainty, and
consider the effect this decision has on the overall stability of
the supply chain.
Index Terms—supply chain, business use case, private
blockchains, atomic, crosschain, function calls, Artificial intel-
ligence, AI, Bayesian network, BN, OOBN, integrated modelling,
Ethereum, sidechains
I. INTRODUCTION
Research has identified several ways in which blockchain
technology can benefit supply chains [1]–[3]. Despite this ac-
tive research area, certain critical challenges remain, especially
around invoice financing for suppliers who do not have the
‘financial standing’ that many tier 1 suppliers enjoy. The per-
ceived standing (essentially the credit rating or financial status)
of the supplier by the invoice financier, directly influences their
risk appetite to finance the supplier’s invoices, i.e. provide
the supplier access, through a short-term business loan, to the
amounts payable to them from unpaid invoices. The upstream
supplier would be considered in a more favourable light by
the financier if they were able to prove that they are part of
a stable supply chain, but for competitive reasons, the retailer
and manufacturer are loathe to disclose their supply chain.
We refer to the tier of a supplier within the context of
the supply chain that it participates in. The number of tiers,
layers or levels, that a supplier is removed from the retailer,
is indicated by the tiered number. The supplier tiers are
illustrated in Figure 1 on page 2 . In general, the further
upstream the supply chain a supplier is, the less inclined
the financier is to finance their invoices. Moreover, brand
awareness influences the perceived standing of the supplier,
as well as the knowledge that the supplier is part of what
the financier considers to be a ‘stable’ supply chain, where
stability is often based on two key factors: whether the retailer
is a well known brand and whether they are financially sound.
However, the factors that can potentially influence the stabil-
ity of the supply chain are far more complex: each participant
in a supply chain has a greater or lesser impact on the supply
chain, and unexpected external events such as natural disasters,
can greatly impact the flow of goods through the supply chain.
Despite potential adverse impacts from suppliers and external
influences, the opportunity exists for an invoice financier to
indirectly and positively influence the stability of a supply
chain if they have the motivation to do so. On the other hand,
they can also be party to the supply chain becoming unstable.
The factors we are focussing on in this paper are two-
fold: the impact on the stability of the supply chain due to
the financial difficulties of one of the parties in the supply
chain, and the challenge of tier 2, 3, and 4 suppliers obtaining
invoicing finance.
If the supplier experiencing financial hardship is replaced
by an unreliable supplier who is unable to deliver the product
on time, this will cause the supply of goods to become
erratic, adversely affecting the business of other suppliers
on the supply chain. Moreover, if the invoice financier is
already funding invoices of another supplier who is part of
the same supply chain, then other suppliers on the supply
chain, including the invoice financier, are likely to be adversely
affected. For example, if an invoice financing company funds
a tier 1 supplier, but does not fund a tier 3 supplier, then this
not only affects the supply chain, but also the financier. Since
the tier 3 supplier has difficulty in getting finance, this affects
the tier 2 supplier which in turn affects the tier 1 supplier
whose invoices the financier has funded.
To more clearly articulate the supply chain challenges for a
supplier who is in urgent need of finance in order to fulfil the
next order, or to expand their business, but who is not a tier 1
supplier, nor part of a stable supply chain, we use a fictitious
supply chain use case, which has been adapted from a real
world use case and simplified.
We proffer that these challenges are not satisfactorily ad-
dressed by current solutions, but have the potential to be solved
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using more advanced and specialised blockchain technolo-
gies such as atomic crosschain function calls across private
blockchains, and using this information to run a model to
assist in the decision making of the invoice financier. We
acknowledge that there may be alternative solutions to the one
we present here, but we propose that our solution presents
a sound and compelling reason to use atomic crosschain
functionality integrated with Bayesian network modelling, an
Artificial Intelligence approach, to provide a quantification
of unintended consequences and the tools to make informed
decisions under uncertainty, using available, but potentially
partial knowledge.
II. EXAMPLE USE CASE
We present a fictional scenario to demonstrate some of
the potential problems that may arise in a supply chain,
and to help articulate which part of the problem statement
we will subsequently explore in more detail. The graphical
representation of this scenario is shown in Figure 1.
Respected supermarket retailer, Golden-Wait-a-Lot, has a
supply chain to provide world famous Mark’s Gourmet May-
onnaise at a very affordable price to its customers. Manufac-
turer Mark has two supply agreements: one with Reginald’s
Regional Produce Store and one with Sanjeeta’s Wholesale
Spices. Mark negotiated a 60 day payment term for invoices
issued by Reginald and Sanjeeta. Reginald prepares the raw
produce that he receives from several farmers, according to
Mark’s requirements, so that they are ready to be blended,
bottled and labelled by Mark for shipment to Golden-Wait-
a-Lot. Reginald has negotiated a 60 day payment term with
Farmer Fran who supplies free-range eggs from her organic
certified farm, a 60 day payment term with Farmer Olivier
who supplies olive oil from olive trees cultivated on his organic
certified farm, and a 30 day payment term with Farmer Lucy
who supplies fresh lemons from her organically certified citrus
farm.
The success of the launch of Mark’s world famous gourmet
mayonnaise range at a few select stores, has exceeded Golden-
Wait-a-Lot’s expectations and they move quickly to expand
this range into many of their other stores, negotiating increased
deliveries of the product from the manufacturer. Although
this appears on the surface to be a success story, it creates
unintended consequences for some of the suppliers in the
supply chain.
A. Problem Statement
One case in point is Farmer Fran, who is unable to service
the increased order that is being requested by Reginald, the
regional producer, as she does not currently have the capacity
to commit to this new quantity. Clearly, the other suppliers in
the supply chain will have their own unique problems to solve
in order to meet increased demand, but for simplicity we will
explore the issues this increased order has on Farmer Fran.
Farmer Fran agreed to supply eggs which were well within
the production range of her brood of hens, and offered lenient
payment terms and competitive pricing with Reginald, which
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of Mark’s gourmet mayonnaise range offered
for sale at Golden Wait-a-Lot
she expected to be more attractive than her business adversary,
Farmer Eric. Fran’s reasoning was that Reginald has been
known to struggle to pay invoices within 30 days, therefore
60 days would be very tempting for him, and coupled with
a good price, he was more likely to accept her offer than
Farmer Eric’s. From her perspective it gave her a stable income
so that she could slowly expand her business. Therefore she
considered it a sensible strategic move. Consequently Farmer
Fran is very reluctant to forfeit this great opportunity to have a
guaranteed market for her organic free range eggs, and agrees
to deliver the additional eggs, at the same high standard.
The immediate challenge that faces Farmer Fran is cash
flow. Personal financing (uncollateralised) is more expensive
than invoice financing (collateralised). She therefore attempts
to get some of her invoices financed earlier, as this will
temporarily alleviate the problem by enabling her to buy
additional eggs as a one-off from her friend and occasional
business partner Farmer Tom. Farmer Tom suggests that she
contacts Invoice Financier Ilze who he believes is funding
Manufacturer Mark’s invoices. Moreover, she does not want
Farmer Eric to realise that she is in financial difficulties as
he may attempt to contact the regional supplier, Reginald, to
negotiate a deal to provide the additional eggs on an ongoing
basis, and potentially exclude her completely from the supply
chain. Therefore, it is important that Farmer Fran finds a way
to prove that she is part of the supply chain to world famous
Mark’s Gourmet Mayonnaise (MGM), knowing MGM would
not disclose their supply chain.
For the long-term sustainability of her business Farmer Fran
requires a business loan to buy the necessary infrastructure to
expand her current business substantially so that she is in a
position to service the increased orders on an ongoing basis.
While embarking on building free-range hen houses she also
needs to adhere to the regulatory requirements to ensure that
she retains her organic, free-range eggs certification, which
has been a long and arduous process to attain. Farmer Tom
recommended that Farmer Fran applies for a business loan
with Lender Luke, who is renowned for being discreet and
trustworthy in business dealings. Farmer Fran is also follow-
ing up on several leads from friends for invoice financiers,
including Invoice Financier Ilze, to finance her outstanding
invoices, but she is not having much success in pursuing
invoice financing, as these companies are notoriously averse
to financing invoices from tier 2, 3 and 4 suppliers.
This scenario presents several challenges for Farmer Fran.
We group the various events and requirements under two
overarching problem statements, P1 and P2:
label=P.1
1) Access to funds to fulfil the increased order within the
requested timeframe
To provide the additional eggs for the next order, Farmer
Fran needs to:
a) Sign an agreement with Reginald’s Regional Pro-
duce for the additional delivery of eggs.
b) Secure invoicing finance for her unpaid invoices
ahead of the scheduled payment date.
c) Source organic, free-range eggs from an alternative
supplier, e.g. Farmer Tom, as a one-off transaction.
d) Ensure data confidentiality of the details of her
contract with Reginald’s Regional Produce Store,
so that:
• Farmer Eric does not know who she is supplying
with eggs, nor the price and payment terms she
negotiated.
• Farmer Tom does not know the payment terms
and price she negotiated.
e) Ensure data confidentiality of her negotiations and
contact with invoicing finance companies, so that:
• Farmer Eric is not aware of her cashflow prob-
lem.
• Other suppliers in the supply chain are not aware
of Farmer Fran’s cashflow problem.
2) Loan to expand organic free-range eggs business to
service increased demand on an ongoing basis
Farmer Fran ideally needs a loan to purchase the in-
frastructure and stock to expand her organic free-range
eggs business, as well as an on-going loan agreement
with an invoice financing company to fund her unpaid
invoices to release funds for her to use as required. For
example, Farmer Fran knows that the egg production of
her brood varies from day to day, and she will therefore
occasionally need to supplement her supply of eggs
with additional eggs from another source in order to
fulfil her order. Moreover, she needs to ensure that all
infrastructure projects adhere to the organic and free
range specifications to maintain her certification.
a) Secure loan for construction of hen houses and
purchase of pullets
• Loan company will perform various checks,
e.g. Farmer Fran’s capacity to service the loan,
to repay it in the requested time-frame, credit
rating.
• Provision of documentation such as bank state-
ments and business accounts.
b) Ensure confidentiality of her loan application,
amount, terms and conditions.
In this paper we focus primarily on invoice financing of
suppliers further upstream in the supply chain, i.e. tiers 2, 3
and 4. For this reason, and to limit the scope of the case study
we describe an approach which addresses the first problem,
P1. This is also the immediate challenge facing Farmer Fran,
i.e. fulfilling the next order. Problem P2 is no less critical, but
arguably not as imminent as P1. Despite focussing on P1, the
approach we describe in Section III: Methods, can readily be
applied to problem P2.
There are a couple of interesting and concerning implica-
tions of invoice funding decisions by a finance company. We
described these in the Introduction, Section I on page 1, viz.
the effect it may have on the finance company itself, and the
overall stability of the supply chain.
III. METHODS
We describe an approach that could be implemented in
smart contracts on private blockchains as part of a decision
making tool for invoice financiers regarding the funding of
invoices of suppliers who are further upstream in the supply
chain, i.e. closer to the sourcing of the raw products being
processed and sold to customers. Using a combination of
Bayesian Networks (BNs) [4], [5], which is an approach to
Artificial intelligence (AI), and crosschain function calls across
private blockchains [6] we can enable financiers to make
informed funding decisions under uncertainty.
The private blockchains are therefore required to have smart
contract capability and atomic crosschain functionality [6].
For example, Pantheon, an Ethereum Java Client designed for
enterprise needs [7], has smart contract capability and privacy
groups which assist in providing data confidentiality [8]. A
privacy group consists of the entities involved in a transaction,
who are the only entities able to view the details of the
transaction. Moreover, the participant list for that transaction
will be hidden from all other parties. However, crosschain
functionality is not yet available in Pantheon, and a proof
of concept is currently being developed by the Sidechains
Research Team at PegaSys/ConsenSys.
In Section III-A we develop a Bayesian network model
which will use the information from the crosschain function
calls described in Section III-B to calculate the probability of
whether the perceived risk of providing finance to the supplier
is acceptable or unacceptable, the most probable decision of
the invoice financier based on the perceived risk and the proba-
bility of the stability of the supply chain of the supplier who is
applying for finance, depending on supplementary information
being available, such as whether the invoice financier already
funds invoices of another supplier in the supply chain.
A. Bayesian network modelling
The AI approach we use is an object oriented Bayesian
network (OOBN) modelling technique. Bayesian networks
(BNs) are probabilistic graphical models [9], [10], and the
process of building the model is typically an iterative process
[11], [12]. We present an initial model where we consider
some of the key pieces of information that contribute to
making an informed decision about invoice funding. BNs are
increasingly integrated with other modelling techniques and
systems [4], [13], and we propose an example of combining
blockchain technology with BN models for invoice funding of
suppliers in a supply chain.
A BN is constructed as a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
with nodes (ellipses) representing the key factors and edges
(arrows) showing the dependencies between nodes [10], [11].
Conditional probability tables are associated with each of
the nodes in the network [10], [11]. These probabilities are
typically constructed from expert knowledge if insufficient
data are available, or may be learnt from data if sufficient
data are available [14], [15]. Moreover, the structure of the
BN can be also be learnt from the data [16], but care needs
to be taken as association between different factors do not
imply causality [15] and often sufficient expert knowledge
is available to determine an overall initial causal structure
of the model, which can then be evaluated and updated
as new information becomes available [15], [17]. Once the
model is constructed, information or knowledge, referred to as
‘evidence’, may be entered in the model and this evidence is
propagated through the model, yielding updated probabilities
based on the evidence entered [17].
Figure 2 (a) and (c) shows two OOBN sub-networks con-
structed using BN software, Hugin [18]: Financial incentive
sub-network and Supplier Profile sub-network, respectively,
which are included in the overall model Figure 2 (b) with
the output nodes of interest: Invoice financing decision and
Supply Chain Stability. Table I contains a list of the nodes
in the BN models and the states of the nodes. For example,
node Financial incentive can be in two states: Compelling or
Not compelling. When the BN model containing this node is
run, it will generate probabilities for both states of the node,
i.e. what is the probability that the Financial incentive node
will be in the Compelling state or Not compelling state. The
various scenarios and results of running the OOBN models
are discussed in the Results section on page 5.
B. Private Blockchains
The blockchain technology design for the example scenario
described in Section II on page 2 consists of several
TABLE I
BAYESIAN NETWORK MODELS FOR THE EXAMPLE USE CASE
BN model Node Node states
Supplier Tier 1 Supplier? Yes, No
Profile Golden Wait-a-Lot Yes, No
Supply Chain?
Supplier Profile Low Risk, High Risk
Financial Credit rating Passed, Failed
incentive Financial rewards Additional, Standard
Financial incentive Compelling,
Not compelling
Overall Supplier Profile Low Risk, High Risk
model Financial incentive Compelling,
Not compelling
Perception of risk Acceptable risk,
Unacceptable risk
Invoice financing Fund supplier
decision invoices, Do not
fund supplier
invoices
Lower tier is funded Yes, No
by invoice finance
company
Supply Chain Stable, Unstable
Stability
private blockchains with participants from the supply chain,
national credit reporting bodies, and organic and free-
range certification authorities. A possible configuration of
blockchains and participants are outlined in Table II on page
4. For clarity we will concentrate mainly on Farmer Fran and
her application for invoicing finance, which are sufficient to
demonstrate cross function calls and the interaction with the
BN decision making tool running on the Financier’s computer
system, and other activities that do not directly relate to the
funding request, are not included in the exposition of private
blockchains and atomic function calls, but are mentioned to
raise awareness that there are many other considerations that
need to be taken into account.
TABLE II
PRIVATE BLOCKCHAINS FOR INVOICE FINANCING PROBLEM SCENARIO
P1
Private Blockchain Participants
identifier
T0T1 Golden Wait-a-Lot (tier 0),
Manufacturer Mark (tier 1)
T1T2 Manufacturer Mark (tier 1),
Reginald’s Regional Produce Store (tier 2),
Sanjeeta’s Wholesale Spices (tier 2)
T2T3 Reginald’s Regional Produce Store (tier 2),
Farmer Fran (tier 3),
Farmer Olivier (tier 3),
Farmer Lucy (tier 3)
T3Fin Farmer Fran (tier 3),
Invoice Financier Ilze
T3T3 Farmer Fran (tier 3),
Farmer Tom (tier 3)
Fin Invoice Financier Ilze
Cert Certification authority
(organic & free-range)
(a) Financial incentive OOBN sub-model
(b) Invoice financing and Supply Chain stability OOBN
(c) Supplier profile OOBN sub-model
Fig. 2. Bayesian network model of invoice financing for a supplier and the
stability of the supply chain
The information that is required from the private
blockchains, some of which have been specifically set up as a
result of Farmer Fran requesting invoice financing to get access
to cash so that she can commit to providing the additional
organic free-range eggs to Regional Producer, Reginald, by
the specified date, involves several transactions (reading and
writing), some of which need to be atomic crosschain function
calls. A detailed description of the blockchains and informa-
tion flow through the system is outlined in Section IV-B on
page 7.
IV. RESULTS
A. BN models
Each of the OOBN sub-models can be run independently,
and as part of the overall BN model (Figure 2 (b)). Various
scenarios are described in this section and the output from
running the scenarios is shown as probabilities that a node is
in a particular state, given the evidence that has been entered
into the model.
1) Supplier Profile OOBN: We ran this model using the
following scenarios. The output is shown as probabilities in
Figure 3 on page 5: label=(a)
1) No evidence
2) Supplier is part of a Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain
3) Supplier is a tier 1 supplier
4) Supplier is part of a Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain,
and a tier 1 supplier
(a) Running model with no evidence entered
(b) Running model with knowledge that supplier is in a
Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain
(c) Running model with knowledge that the supplier is a tier
1 supplier
(d) Running model with knowledge that the supplier is a tier
1 supplier in a Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain
Fig. 3. Supplier Profile Bayesian network model with various scenarios
The main output node that we are interested in, Supplier
Profile, is an input node into the overall model. With no
information entered into the OOBN (scenario (a)) we observe
that the supplier profile has uniform probability and is uninfor-
mative. If we enter evidence that the supplier is known to be
part of a Golden Wait-a-Lot (GWaL) supply chain (scenario
(b)) then the perceived profile of the supplier is that they are
most likely to be low risk with a probability of 79.5%. If
we know that the supplier is a tier 1 supplier, but we have
no information regarding their participation in a GWaL chain
(scenario (c)), then the most likely outcome is still that the
supplier is low risk, but with a probability of 69.5% which is
less than the knowledge of being in a GWaL supply chain. If
we enter evidence that the supplier is both a tier 1 supplier
and in the GWaL supply chain (scenario (d)) then it is highly
likely, 99.0%, that the supplier is low risk to the financier.
2) Financial incentive OOBN: We ran this model using the
following scenarios. The output is shown as probabilities in
Figure 4 on page 8: label=(a)
1) No evidence
2) Supplier is offering additional financial rewards, e.g. of-
fering above the normal discount rate for early payment
3) Supplier passed the credit check
4) Supplier failed the credit check, but is offering additional
financial rewards
5) Supplier passed the credit check, and is offering only
the standard financial reward
6) Supplier passed the credit check, and is offering addi-
tional financial rewards
The main output node that we are interested in, Financial
incentive, is an input node into the overall model. With no
information entered into the OOBN model (scenario (a)) we
observe that the Financial incentive output node has uniform
probability and is uninformative. If we enter evidence that the
supplier is offering better than the standard financial rewards
to the invoice financier, but without knowledge of their credit
rating (scenario (b)) then the probability that the incentive
is compelling to the financier is 60.0%. There is a greater
probability of a compelling incentive to the financier (90.0%)
to fund invoices of the supplier, if the supplier passed the
credit rating assessment, despite the financier not having any
knowledge of the financial rewards they are offering (scenario
(c)). If we consider being able to provide evidence about both
the credit rating assessment and the financial rewards, we
discover that the probability of the financial incentive being
compelling is only 20.0% if the supplier failed the credit
rating assessment, even if they are offering additional financial
rewards to the invoice financier. On the other hand, if the
supplier passed the credit rating test, and is only offering
the standard financial reward expected by invoice financiers
(scenario (e)), then the incentive to finance them is 80.0%
compelling. The best case scenario, (f), is a supplier who has
passed the credit rating assessment and is offering additional
financial rewards. In this case they present a very highly
compelling financial incentive (99.0 % probability) to the
invoice financier to fund their invoices.
3) Overall OOBN model: The overall model has input
nodes from the two sub-networks so that evidence entered
into these sub-networks will flow through to the overall BN
model.
We ran the overall model using the following scenarios. The
output is shown as probabilities in Figure 5 and 6 on page 8:
label=(a)
1) No evidence
2) Supplier is in a Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain
3) Supplier is in a Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain and
passed the credit check
4) Supplier is in a Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain, has
passed the credit check, is not a tier 1 supplier (e.g. a
tier 2 or 3) and the lower tier (e.g. tier 1) is funded by
the invoice finance company
5) Decision was made not to fund the supplier (e.g. tier 2
or 3), although the lower tier (e.g. tier 1) is funded by
the financier
With no information entered into the OOBN model (sce-
nario (a)) we observe that the nodes of interest, Perception
of Risk, Invoice financing decision and Supply Chain Stability
have uniform probability and is uninformative. If it is known
that the supplier is part of a Golden Wait-a-Lot supply chain
(scenario (b)), then the risk profile of the supplier is considered
an acceptable risk with a probability of 61.8%, Figure 5 (b) on
page 8. If we also include evidence that the supplier passed the
credit rating assessment (scenario (c)), then the perception of
acceptable risk increases to 85.7%, Figure 5 (c) on page 8. A
more informative scenario, scenario (d), has evidence entered
into the various OOBN models to represent that the supplier
who is applying for invoice financing is in a Golden Wait-a-
Lot supply chain, has passed the credit check, is not a tier
1 supplier and the lower tier is funded by the same invoice
finance company. In this situation the invoice financier is
informed that the model predicts the most probable outcome to
be to fund the supplier with a probability of 77.4% and that the
probability of the supply chain being stable is 76.8% (Figure 6
on page 9). The final scenario excludes any information prior
to the evidence entered, due to the structure of the model and
only the evidence of two nodes are used to assess the stability
of the supply chain that the supplier is part of: whether the
decision was to fund the supplier and whether the invoices of
another supplier in the supply chain that this supplier directly
or indirectly supplies, is already being funded by the finance
company. If the decision is not to fund the supplier, but the
lower tier supplier is funded by the financier (scenario (e)), we
see that the supply chain becomes highly unstable with 99.0%
probability.
It is important to note that the OOBN model structures
and conditional probability tables were constructed to illustrate
the interaction of various factors in invoice financing decision
making, using information that can be retrieved using atomic
crosschain function calls. As mentioned previously BN model
development is an iterative process and the model structure
and parameters refined over time. These probabilities were
constructed in the context of the use case and we do not claim
that they are accurate, but they can readily be updated and the
model structure refined to suit specific requirements.
B. Private blockchains and crosschain function calls
The sequence diagram in Figure 7 on page 10 shows the
private blockchain deployment, smart contract deployment,
and atomic crosschain transaction flow. The participants of
the system are listed on the left of the diagram, and the
private blockchains to the right of the diagram.
Walking through the sequence diagram:
1) Regional Producer Reginald deploys a Supply Smart
Contract to the T2T3 blockchain. He then uploads the
Supply Agreement between Reginald and Farmer Fran,
signed only by him, to the Smart Contract.
2) Farmer Fran downloads the Supply Agreement.
3) Farmer Fran counter-signs the Supply Agreement and
uploads the counter-signed Supply Agreement to the
Supply Smart Contract.
4) Farmer Fran establishes a private blockchain between
herself and Invoice Financier Ilze. This private
blockchain is called T3Fin blockchain.
5) Invoice Financier Ilze automatically deploys a standard
Finance Smart Contract to the T3Fin blockchain
immediately after the blockchain is deployed.
6) Farmer Fran submits an Atomic Crosschain Transaction
to request invoice financing. In this request she specifies
the required information: the amount of funding she is
requesting, invoice payment terms, supply agreement
terms, total amounts payable from unpaid invoices, and
the blockchain on which the supply agreement resides.
7) The Atomic Crosschain Transaction call does a
Crosschain Read, requesting the counter-signed Supply
Agreement from the T2T3 blockchain.
8) The Atomic Crosschain Transaction performs some
processing on the T3Fin blockchain to validate the
invoice financing request from Farmer Fran. For
example, it checks to see if the amount of funding
requested is in agreement with the counter signed
Supply Agreement.
9) The Atomic Crosschain Transaction passes the financing
request to Invoice Financier Ilze’s private blockchain,
Fin blockchain, for processing.
10) The Atomic Crosschain Transaction then operates on
the Fin blockchain. The credit rating of Farmer Fran
is checked using the access that Invoice Financier Ilze
has to the National Credit Reporting Bodies. Financier
Ilze checks her customer list to see if Reginald who
Fran has the supply agreement with is already being
funded by her company. The Bayesian network model
is executed using whatever information is available to
the financier, and the result of these analyses forms the
basis for a funding decision.
11) Assuming the funding decision is to approve the funding
for Farmer Fran, the Atomic Crosschain Transaction
results in Ether (money) being transferred from the Fin
blockchain to the T3Fin blockchain.
12) The Atomic Crosschain Transaction then completes
with the Ether (money) being transferred from Invoice
Financier Ilze to Farmer Fran.
(a) Running model with no evidence entered
(b) Running model with evidence that supplier is offering
additional financial rewards
(c) Running model with evidence that the supplier has
passed the credit check
(d) Running model with evidence that the supplier failed the
credit check, but is offering additional financial rewards
(e) Running model with evidence that the supplier passed the
credit check, and is offering just the standard financial
rewards
(f) Running model with evidence that the supplier passed the
credit check, and is offering additional financial rewards
Fig. 4. Financial Incentives Bayesian network model with various scenarios
(a) Running model without any evidence entered into the BN
(b) Supplier is in the GWaL supply chain
(c) Supplier is in the GWaL supply chain and passed the
credit rating assessment
Fig. 5. Overall Bayesian network model with various scenarios
(d) Supplier is in GWaL supply chain, passed credit check,
is not a tier 1 supplier and the lower tier is funded by the
invoice finance company
(e) Decision was made not to fund the supplier (e.g. tier 2 or
3), although the lower tier (e.g. tier 1) is funded by the
financier
Fig. 6. Overall Bayesian network model with various scenarios
Fig. 7. Invoice Financing Sequence Diagram
V. DISCUSSION
The problem statement for the example use case, albeit fic-
titious, demonstrates that an upstream supplier (e.g. tier 2, 3 or
4) could encounter an unanticipated cashflow problem, despite
conducting due diligence to ensure that they were in a good
position to meet demand, prior to signing an initial supply
agreement. The most astute and cost-effective finance option
to address the cashflow problem is collatoralised finance, such
as invoice financing. However, as discussed previously, it is not
a simple task to obtain the required information to help secure
funding. In fact, they typically face substantial hurdles with
manufacturers and retailers not prepared to disclose sensitive
business information, but wanting to keep this information
private.
In some instances, for example if a financier is able to
link the applicant and one of their customers as belonging
to the same supply chain, then this information is important
for invoice financiers to make well considered and informed
funding decisions under uncertainty, by running a decision
making tool such as a Bayesian network model which can
generate the probability distribution across the states of the
node that they are interested in, e.g. the perception of risk, or
the decision to fund a supplier.
Tier 1 suppliers in a supply chain of a well known retailer,
typically have no problem to have their invoices funded earlier
by an invoicing financier, since they are considered as low
risk companies and their approved invoices are read into the
financier’s systems, ready to be financed on the payment dates.
Therefore if the tier 1 supplier offers the retailer a discount
of say 5% to fund their invoices ahead of the payment date,
for reasons such as short term cash flow, or to pursue new
business opportunities or to gain greater market share, this
is a fairly straight forward transaction, which is most likely
pre-approved. However, tier 2, 3, and 4 suppliers usually do
not enjoy such ready access to funds. For example, Farmer
Fran in the example use case would be a tier 3 supplier.
In these instances the invoice financing company would not
be interested to fund the supplier’s invoices, unless further
information is provided, which can be made accessible by
crosschain function calls. In the Methods section on 3 we
outline a potential solution combining novel technologies such
as atomic crosschain functionality [6] with Bayesian network
models [10].
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed solution in this paper addresses the challenge
of financing suppliers further upstream in the supply chain,
who are often smaller suppliers, unable to demonstrate credit
worthiness, possibly partly due to a lack of good accounts and
documentation, and therefore unable to present the required
information to secure funding. The crux of the matter is that
if one or more of the participants in a supply chain are unable
to get their invoices funded when necessary, then this is very
likely to have repercussions for the rest of the participants in
the supply chain, and potentially dire consequences for the
financiers of the supply chain.
Utilising the information obtained with atomic crosschain
calls between private blockchains [6] we have the ability to
prove relationships in the supply chain without having to
publicly disclose other more sensitive information such as
quantities and prices, and combined with BN modelling, an AI
approach, we are able to gain access to information required
by an invoice financier to make informed funding decisions
under uncertainty. Moreover, the BN model structure and
probabilities can be updated as more data become available
and knowledge gaps are identified and addressed [19].
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